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Recently released documents offer a blow by blow account of Islamabad's quest for a nuclear device
One of the biggest headaches of the 20th century that troubled the diplomats all over the world has been 'How to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime'? US, predictably, tried to take the leadership role, but managed to have a mixed record. Nevertheless, the deliberations in the 1970s and 80s give a clear view into how things were operating in those times and how some decisions, had they been taken at the right juncture, could have had long lasting effects.
The recently released documents by the National Security Archive at Washington DC give a blow-by-blow analysis of deliberations that took place between Islamabad and Washington DC in the 70s with respect to the former's quest for a nuclear device. The alarm bell started ringing in Washington DC way back in the late 1970s when it was revealed that a young bright Pakistani metallurgist named Abdul Qadir Khan got hold of the blueprints for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.
South Asia, that had seen a war in 1971 was on the verge of becoming a powder keg as India was already in the advance stage of mastering the uncontrolled fission reaction. The US realised that a nuclear Pakistan would make the situation worse. It catalysed the most interesting deliberations in the proliferation's history.
It all started soon after Jimmy Carter assumed office as the US president. Carter was briefed that Pakistan, US's key ally and a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty non-signatory, had managed to lay its hand on primal elements of a nuclear weapons capability. The Pakistani nuclear subject was on Carter's docket because he brought a fundamental earnestness in reducing nuclear weaponry and in halting nuclear proliferation. His primary, though unfulfilled goal, of massive reduction of strategic nuclear forces, and his reinforcement of CTBT were indicators that he was a serious player hard to browbeat.
In 1973, long before Carter entered the White House, Islamabad had started negotiations to purchase a nuclear reprocessing facility for Plutonium from a French firm. The CIA was famously hoodwinked. However, it was only as late as 1978 that a series of fishy acquisitions detected by British customs led to the revelation that Pakistan was secretly getting hold of technology to make highly-enriched Uranium as a secondary path to the bomb. The “extensive foreign assistance” propositioned by the CIA in its estimate was actually the theft of plans for a gas centrifuge enrichment technology from the Uranium Enrichment Corporation in the Netherlands.
Before this, the Ford regime too had unsuccessfully tried to deter Pakistan from achieving its goal. However, the intelligence on the progress over the bomb quest came a little too late. It was only in 1978 that CIA managed to find that Islamabad was moving fast to construct a gas centrifuge apparatus. It was made possible because of the “dual use ” technology that was provided by A Q Khan through his network in the several western regimes. It triggered a complex effort by the Americans to convince or cajole Pakistan to turn off the gas centrifuge project. The process was multi-pronged and included all sorts of direct and indirect pressures. Not only did the US regime try to pressurise the then Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his successor General Zia-ul-Haq, it also tried to collaborate with its other allies and China to convince Islamabad to see the light. It virtually managed to put an embargo over the sale of sensitive technology to Pakistan that the latter so much wanted to give its quest a one last boost.
But Islamabad was not ready to sit quietly and take it. Efforts were met with intense resistance from top players in Islamabad. Pakistan, on its part, maintained that it sees the nuclear capability as an issue of national survival. When it appeared that Pakistan was not easily to be cowed down, Washington tried to extract promise that it will not try to use reprocessing technology to produce Plutonium. It was an important departure from the Carter Administration's earlier stand. However, Islamabad was in no mood to relent. The then foreign minister Agha Shahi curtly told Americans that it was a “demand that no country would accept ” and that Pakistan “has the unfettered right to do what it wishes”. It was mid-1978.
By January 1979, CIA's intelligence estimate indicated that Islamabad was fast approaching a juncture where it “may soon acquire all the essential components” for a gas centrifuge plant. But the biggest bang in the cable was the estimate that Islamabad will manage to fix a “single device” (Plutonium) by 1982 and consequently test a weapon using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) by 1983. However, a note at the end said that 1984 appeared to be the more realistic deadline.
The US appeared desperate to stop Islamabad from achieving it. By this time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the game changed. It was probably the biggest bet in the cold war and the US wanted to win it at any cost. Pakistan become a key front line state and the sway Washington had on Islamabad, diminished. The relations improved dramatically and, according to CIA analysts, Pakistani officials became convinced that although grudgingly, Washington had “reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability ”.
The incident is a classic case that exemplifies the complexity and trouble of the nuclear proliferation diplomacy. Some other policy-making and strategical precedences can and do outflank nonproliferation goals. It also, in many ways, shows how difficult it is to stop an ally from going nuclear.
For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles.
IIPM ranks No 1 in International Exposure in the 'Third Mail Today B-School Survey'
Management Guru Arindam Chaudhuri Dean Business School IIPM
IIPM Excom Prof Rajita Chaudhuri
Kapil Sibal’s voters want Jan Lokpal, not Government-proposed Lokpal Bill
"Thorns to Competition" amongst the top 10 best sellers of the week.
IIPM RANKED NO.1 in MAIL TODAY B-SCHOOL RANKINGS
'Thorns to Competition' - You can order your copy online from here
IIPM Mumbai Campus
Recently released documents offer a blow by blow account of Islamabad's quest for a nuclear device
One of the biggest headaches of the 20th century that troubled the diplomats all over the world has been 'How to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime'? US, predictably, tried to take the leadership role, but managed to have a mixed record. Nevertheless, the deliberations in the 1970s and 80s give a clear view into how things were operating in those times and how some decisions, had they been taken at the right juncture, could have had long lasting effects.
The recently released documents by the National Security Archive at Washington DC give a blow-by-blow analysis of deliberations that took place between Islamabad and Washington DC in the 70s with respect to the former's quest for a nuclear device. The alarm bell started ringing in Washington DC way back in the late 1970s when it was revealed that a young bright Pakistani metallurgist named Abdul Qadir Khan got hold of the blueprints for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.
South Asia, that had seen a war in 1971 was on the verge of becoming a powder keg as India was already in the advance stage of mastering the uncontrolled fission reaction. The US realised that a nuclear Pakistan would make the situation worse. It catalysed the most interesting deliberations in the proliferation's history.
It all started soon after Jimmy Carter assumed office as the US president. Carter was briefed that Pakistan, US's key ally and a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty non-signatory, had managed to lay its hand on primal elements of a nuclear weapons capability. The Pakistani nuclear subject was on Carter's docket because he brought a fundamental earnestness in reducing nuclear weaponry and in halting nuclear proliferation. His primary, though unfulfilled goal, of massive reduction of strategic nuclear forces, and his reinforcement of CTBT were indicators that he was a serious player hard to browbeat.
In 1973, long before Carter entered the White House, Islamabad had started negotiations to purchase a nuclear reprocessing facility for Plutonium from a French firm. The CIA was famously hoodwinked. However, it was only as late as 1978 that a series of fishy acquisitions detected by British customs led to the revelation that Pakistan was secretly getting hold of technology to make highly-enriched Uranium as a secondary path to the bomb. The “extensive foreign assistance” propositioned by the CIA in its estimate was actually the theft of plans for a gas centrifuge enrichment technology from the Uranium Enrichment Corporation in the Netherlands.
Before this, the Ford regime too had unsuccessfully tried to deter Pakistan from achieving its goal. However, the intelligence on the progress over the bomb quest came a little too late. It was only in 1978 that CIA managed to find that Islamabad was moving fast to construct a gas centrifuge apparatus. It was made possible because of the “dual use ” technology that was provided by A Q Khan through his network in the several western regimes. It triggered a complex effort by the Americans to convince or cajole Pakistan to turn off the gas centrifuge project. The process was multi-pronged and included all sorts of direct and indirect pressures. Not only did the US regime try to pressurise the then Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his successor General Zia-ul-Haq, it also tried to collaborate with its other allies and China to convince Islamabad to see the light. It virtually managed to put an embargo over the sale of sensitive technology to Pakistan that the latter so much wanted to give its quest a one last boost.
But Islamabad was not ready to sit quietly and take it. Efforts were met with intense resistance from top players in Islamabad. Pakistan, on its part, maintained that it sees the nuclear capability as an issue of national survival. When it appeared that Pakistan was not easily to be cowed down, Washington tried to extract promise that it will not try to use reprocessing technology to produce Plutonium. It was an important departure from the Carter Administration's earlier stand. However, Islamabad was in no mood to relent. The then foreign minister Agha Shahi curtly told Americans that it was a “demand that no country would accept ” and that Pakistan “has the unfettered right to do what it wishes”. It was mid-1978.
By January 1979, CIA's intelligence estimate indicated that Islamabad was fast approaching a juncture where it “may soon acquire all the essential components” for a gas centrifuge plant. But the biggest bang in the cable was the estimate that Islamabad will manage to fix a “single device” (Plutonium) by 1982 and consequently test a weapon using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) by 1983. However, a note at the end said that 1984 appeared to be the more realistic deadline.
The US appeared desperate to stop Islamabad from achieving it. By this time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the game changed. It was probably the biggest bet in the cold war and the US wanted to win it at any cost. Pakistan become a key front line state and the sway Washington had on Islamabad, diminished. The relations improved dramatically and, according to CIA analysts, Pakistani officials became convinced that although grudgingly, Washington had “reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability ”.
The incident is a classic case that exemplifies the complexity and trouble of the nuclear proliferation diplomacy. Some other policy-making and strategical precedences can and do outflank nonproliferation goals. It also, in many ways, shows how difficult it is to stop an ally from going nuclear.
For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles.
IIPM ranks No 1 in International Exposure in the 'Third Mail Today B-School Survey'
Management Guru Arindam Chaudhuri Dean Business School IIPM
IIPM Excom Prof Rajita Chaudhuri
Kapil Sibal’s voters want Jan Lokpal, not Government-proposed Lokpal Bill
"Thorns to Competition" amongst the top 10 best sellers of the week.
IIPM RANKED NO.1 in MAIL TODAY B-SCHOOL RANKINGS
'Thorns to Competition' - You can order your copy online from here
IIPM Mumbai Campus
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